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Abstract
In the last decade, the increased competition between European stock exchanges has reduced the cost
of trading and increased the variety of trading mechanisms.  The London Stock Exchange, which
initiated the competition in 1986 by setting up the SEAQ-I market, attracted considerable trading
volume in Continental equities in the late 1980s.  Later, however, Continental exchanges recovered
most of the trading volume from London upon restructuring their auction systems so as to offer very
low trading costs, greater transparency and continuous trading via an automated order book.  At the
same time, the spreads quoted by SEAQ-I dealers increased considerably. Lately, potential
competition by continuous auction systems is threatening even the market for British equities, and
prompting the London Stock Exchange to replace its former SEAQ system with an automated order
book. As in Continental Bourses, this automated auction system is expected to run in parallel with a
dealership market for large trades.  So trading systems appear to be converging towards a dualistic
structure all over Europe. The paper documents these developments, and considers how the
competition between European exchanges is likely to evolve and which opportunities and dangers the
future may hold for them.
*  This paper partly draws on material that I contributed to chapter 1 of the report “The European
Equity Market”, sponsored by the European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) and published by
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996. An earlier version was circulated in
March 1996 as Special Paper No. 83 of the LSE Financial Markets Group under the title “The
Cost of Trading in European Equity Markets”. I thank Didier Davydoff, Marianne Demarchi,
Luca Filippa, Torsten Lüdecke, Martin Reck, Hartmut Schmidt and Stephen Wells for providing
useful data, Giovanni Radicella and Gianluca Lobefalo for their helpful research assistance, and
the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche for partial financial support.2
Table of contents
1. Introduction
2. The background: a decade of competitive reform
2.1. Stage 1: London starts competing for foreign equity trading
2.2. Stage 2: Continental exchanges respond to the challenge
2.2.1. Paris
2.2.2. Madrid, Brussels and Milan
2.2.3. Germany
2.2.4. Amsterdam
2.3.  Effects of the reforms of Continental exchanges
2.4. Stage 3: London market makers come under pressure
3.  The current picture: transaction costs in the competing markets
3.1. Liquidity and immediacy
3.2. Competition and interdependence
3.2.1. Impact of the Continental Bourses’ trading on SEAQ-I spreads
3.2.2. Continuous arbitrage and cross-border trading
4.  Likely future developments
4.1. Further increase in competition between exchanges
4.1.1. Causes ...
4.1.2.  ... and effects of increased competition
4.2. Long-run forces shaping European equity markets3
1. Introduction
In the last decade, the microstructure of European equity markets has
changed dramatically.  Trading costs have been reduced and the variety of
trading mechanisms has increased substantially.  Most European “blue chip”
stocks are now simultaneously traded in continuous auction (or “order-
driven”) systems and in dealer (or “quote-driven”) markets, not to mention
the hybrid systems that have emerged in some exchanges.  The pressure on
trading costs and the proliferation of alternative trading mechanisms are
both due to an unprecedented wave of competition among European
exchanges.
In this ongoing competitive struggle, the balance between the contenders’
forces has shifted considerably.  The London exchange, which started the
competition with the inception of the SEAQ International (SEAQ-I) quote-
driven trading system in 1986, was initially able to attract large trading
volumes from Continental exchanges.  In the late 1980s, London appeared
on its way toward becoming the main marketplace for all the blue-chip
European stocks.  But in those same years, the main Continental exchanges
underwent a radical restructuring of their trading mechanism and
regulations, introducing continuous, electronic order-driven systems,
liberalizing access to their membership, reducing transaction taxes, etc.
This strategy allowed them to stage a formidable comeback in the early
1990s. The London dealers’ share of trading volume in Continental stocks
declined considerably.  And even the London market for British stocks
started facing the competitive pressure of order-driven trading systems, such
as the London-based Tradepoint system, modeled on the Continental
electronic auction markets, and EUROCAC, a new segment of the French
Bourse specializing in British and other Continental stocks.  As a result,
after much controversy, the London Stock Exchange is currently replacing
its quote-driven SEAQ system with an order-driven system similar to those
used in Continental exchanges, while retaining its traditional dealer market
for large trades.  This underscores an impressive convergence among
European exchanges towards a common dualistic structure, formed by an
automated auction system specializing in small and medium-sized trades
and a market-making segment devoted to large trades.
At the same time, new contenders are about to enter the arena.
“Proprietary trading systems” (PTSs), i.e. trading systems managed by
private brokers, may soon start to attract a portion of the order flow away
from traditional membership exchanges.  The competition - both among4
traditional exchanges and between them and PTSs - is likely to be enhanced
by the introduction of the new regulatory framework of the Investment
Services Directive, which facilitates cross-border branching by the trading
systems of regulated markets and remote trading by financial intermediaries.
In this paper I overview how the trading systems of the main European
exchanges have changed in this turbulent decade, illustrating the initial
move by the London Stock Exchange, the competitive response of the
Continental exchanges, and the recent overhaul of the London trading
system under the competitive threat of order-driven markets (section 2). I
also assess how these changes in the exchanges’ structure and operations
affected their trading costs and competitive positions, and show that their
mutual relationship is marked by interdependence as much as by
competition (section 3).   Finally, I discuss how the competition between
European exchanges is likely to evolve, and which opportunities and
dangers it may harbor in the near future (section 4).
2. The background: a decade of competitive reform
Until 1985, European equity markets still worked according to a blueprint
laid out in the 19th century.  Continental Europe featured call auction
markets with open outcry dealing, where publicly licensed single-capacity
1
intermediaries conveyed the orders of their customers and were
compensated via statutorily fixed commissions.  In London, stock trading
was managed by dealers, called “jobbers”, who received the customers’
orders via single-capacity brokers, and commissions were fixed by the
members of the exchange.  In all countries, the stock exchange was a closed
membership organization, with high barriers to potential entrants.  Each
exchange operated in isolation from the others, well sheltered from
competition by national regulations and especially by barriers to capital
mobility and high costs of telecommunication.
These obstacles started to wither away in the mid-1980s. European
integration lead to increasing capital mobility and technology made
1  A single-capacity intermediary acts only as agent (on account of the clientele) or as principal (on
own account).  A dual-capacity intermediary acts in both roles.5
telecommunications cheaper and more effective.  At the same time,
institutional investors stepped up their participation in international equity
markets, and their hunger for international diversification lead to a rapid
increase in cross-border trading.
2.1. Stage 1: London starts competing for foreign equity trading
The London Stock Exchange was the first in Europe to react to these new
opportunities, albeit not without fierce resistance by many of its members.
In 1986, it embarked on a series of reforms of its domestic equity market
nicknamed “Big Bang”. The reforms involved scrapping the old-fashioned
distinction between jobbers and brokers, opening dealership to banks and
other financial institutions, liberalizing commissions, and introducing a
screen-based system, modeled on the US NASDAQ system and called
SEAQ, where dual-capacity dealers could post their quotes.  These changes
were not limited to the market for British stocks: a similar screen-based
system, named SEAQ International (or SEAQ-I), was created also for stocks
listed in Continental European exchanges.  For each foreign stock traded on
SEAQ-I, a set of designated market-makers were charged to provide bid and
ask quotes during the relevant “mandatory quote period” for trades of a
minimum size, named “Normal Market Size” (NMS).  To increase further
the competitiveness of the London market, the stamp duty on British equity
trades was  halved, and no stamp duty was levied on trades involving
foreign equities.
These reforms were very successful. They helped the City of London to
capitalize on the traditional presence of a large number of international
investors, especially US banks and investment funds, and to become the
natural port of access to the equity markets of Continental Europe. The new
trading system catered to the needs of these market participants better than
the Continental exchanges.  First, being available on the phone throughout
the trading day, SEAQ-I market makers provided greater immediacy than
the Continental call auction markets.  Second, the SEAQ-I dealers provided
a deep market, standing ready to trade very large blocks of stock.  Third, the
absence of taxes on foreign stock transactions added to the attractions of the
London market.
A measure of the success of SEAQ-I in the late 1980s is provided by its
increasing share of turnover in Continental European equities.  The figures
in Pagano and Röell (1991) and (1993a), reported in the upper panel of6
Table 1, show that the ratio between SEAQ-I turnover in French, German
and Spanish stocks and their domestic turnover rose between 1988 and
1989, and the same happened for Italian stocks between 1989 and 1990
(Italian stocks started trading on SEAQ-I only in 1989).
2 The lower panel of
Table 1 reports the same measures for 1990-1991 and a larger set of
countries, drawn from Worthington (1991).
3 For German and French stocks
the turnover ratio approximately stabilized between 1990 and the first
quarter of 1991, whereas it kept growing for Italian and Spanish stocks, and
even more so for Dutch, Swiss and Swedish equities. The table also shows
that, as of the beginning of 1991, London had managed to attract a relatively
large share of overall trading in Continental European equities.
But these figures are to be treated with great caution.  First, they are
vitiated by severe statistical problems. Reported trading volume in a
dealership market is not directly comparable with turnover in an auction
market.  A direct customer trade with a London exchange member generates
a “cascade” of inter-dealer transactions, by which the dealer rebalances his
inventories - an effect not present in an auction market when two
customers’ orders are crossed.  In addition, trades effected in Continental
Bourses by London-based dealers are often also reported in London.
Second, and more importantly, not all the London trading in non-UK
stocks must be interpreted as trade diverted away from the respective
domestic exchanges. In part, it reflects trades created by the availability of
the SEAQ-I dealers.  In the late 1980s many institutional investors,
especially from the US, started to diversify into European stocks because
they could trade them with London dealers in large blocks and with a high
degree of immediacy, whereas they had refrained from doing so when the
same stocks had to be traded clumsily in the unfamiliar, slow-paced and thin
auction markets in the Continent.
At least for Italian and Belgian stocks, the available evidence actually
indicates that the inception of trading on SEAQ-I did not reduce turnover in
the domestic exchanges.  Pagano and Röell (1991) and Impenna, Maggio
2  Since SEAQ International and the German exchanges count both purchases and sales, in Table 1
their turnover figures are divided by two.
3  The figures in the lower panel of the table are not directly comparable with those reported by
Pagano and Röell (1991, 1993a), because after February 1990 the data on the turnover by
members of the London stock exchange have become more complete and reliable.7
and Panetta (1995) document that for several Italian stocks the inception of
SEAQ-I trading increased trading volume on the Milan stock exchange.
4
Trade diversion appears to have been large and statistically significant only
for few high-volume stocks.  Pagano and Röell report that the inception of
SEAQ-I trading had no effect on overall Milan turnover at conventional
significance levels.
5 In a similar study of Belgian cross-listed stocks,
Anderson and Tychon (1993) conclude that London trading on balance has
stimulated greater trading in Brussels. These results are reasonable,
considering that London dealers routinely use Continental exchanges to
unload part of their excess positions, so that flurries of trading activity in
London also raise trading in the corresponding Continental markets.
TABLE 1.  TRADING OF CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN STOCKS EFFECTED BY
MEMBERS OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, AS PERCENTAGE OF
STOCK TRADING ON ‘HOME’ COUNTRY EXCHANGE











4  Both studies estimate volume regressions in which the explanatory variables are a constant, the
trading volume for the entire market, the average monthly return on the relevant stock and its
estimated monthly volatility, and a dummy for the inception of SEAQ-I trading (or the actual
volume of SEAQ-I trading since inception).   Pagano and Röell (1991) employ monthly data over
the 1982-1990  interval for 12 stocks.  Impenna et al. (1995) employ monthly data for the 1985-
1993 interval for 23 stocks.
5  This statement has to be taken cautiously, because of several limitations of the data.  The Italian
turnover data omit the large off-exchange turnover that in Italy occurred at the time to which the
data refer (1982-1990): off-exchange trading volume could have been diverted to London, and the
data would not reveal it.  In addition, the inception of trading on SEAQ-I may be
unrepresentative, because several Italian stocks were unofficially traded in London before being
assigned to a SEAQ-I market maker.8
Panel B (from Worthington, 1991)
Nationality
of stock
1990 Q1 1990 Q2 1990 Q3 1990 Q4 1991 Q1
German 12.5 12.2 11.3 12.8 10.3
French 26.9 26.8 25.3 26.3 29.5
Italian 23.1 18.1 19.1 27.1 24.7
Spanish 14.3 15.9 25.5 18.4 18.4
Dutch 38.3 49.8 63.0 54.2 52.9
Swiss -- .- 29.2 25.5 33.5 35.5
Swedish 39.5 64.9 62.4 50.0 45.0
2.2. Stage 2: Continental exchanges respond to the challenge
The danger of losing business to London pushed Continental policy-
makers to embark in a complete overhaul of their traditional systems: the
challenge represented by SEAQ-I set in motion a competition between
national exchanges and regulators which is still going on.  The Paris Bourse
has been the first one to respond to London’s competitive threat, and its
response has been very closely emulated by Madrid and Milan. The German
and Dutch markets have also been substantially reorganized in the early
1990s, but along somewhat different lines.
2.2.1. Paris
The response of the French market turned on four key innovations, which
were implemented sequentially: (i) the introduction of continuous screen-
based trading; (ii) the replacement of publicly appointed brokers with
corporate dual-capacity intermediaries; (iii) the liberalization of9
commissions; (iv) the partial amendment of the principle that trade should
be concentrated in one market.
 Starting in July 1986, a continuous auction with automatic clearing
replaced the old system of call auctions with open outcry dealing: trading in
almost all the stocks was gradually transferred from the floor to a
computerized facility where incoming orders are instantaneously executed
against outstanding limit orders (CAC: Cotation Assistée en Continu).   The
call auction was retained only as an opening mechanism (orders placed
before the opening are traded in an electronic call auction at 10:00 a.m.).
The hallmark of the CAC system is its extreme degree of transparency, in
the sense that market participants have a very accurate picture of the limit
orders already placed on the market and still awaiting execution (pre-trade
transparency) and very timely information about the trades which have just
been executed (post-trade transparency).  The stock exchange member firms
(societés de bourse) have access to the whole order book, including the
codes identifying the member firms which have placed limit orders on the
book.  The only exception are “hidden orders”,  special limit orders which
are only partly visible by other market participants: the undisclosed portion
of these orders is called upon to fill incoming orders as soon as the visible
portion is exhausted.  Post-trade publication used to be immediate for all
trades, and to include not only the price and the quantity of each trade, but
also the codes of the member firms involved.  But recently, on request by
member firms, trade publication has been slowed down for trades involving
member firms as principals
6and the codes of the firms involved in the last
trade are no longer published for the most active stocks.
The second step of the French reform was to end the monopoly of stock
trading by the agents de change, who traded only on client account,
replacing them in January 1988 with new corporate intermediaries, named
societés de bourse, who operate as dual-capacity dealers. This opened stock
exchange membership to banks and securities firms, provided they set up a
separately capitalized subsidiary in the form of a société de bourse. The aim
6  From September 1994, if one of the parties involved is a member firm, the delay before
publication is 2 hours if the trade does not exceed 5 times the “normal block size”, and 1 day
above this threshold.  The “normal block size” is determined by the Paris Bourse, and as a rule it
is about 2.5 percent of the average trading volume over the previous 3 months.  In any event, it
cannot be less than 1 million Francs, and it is between 5 and 10 million Francs for the stocks of
large companies.10
was to induce more capitalized intermediaries to take position on the market
by feeding limit orders on own account, and thus provide liquidity to other
market participants.  By the end of 1989, banks and securities firms, often
foreign-based ones, bought stakes in about two-thirds of the sociétés de
bourse.
The third step of the reform was to liberalize the members’ commissions
in July 1989, to increase the competitiveness of the French market.  More
recently, this was enhanced by fixing a 4,000 Francs ceiling to the stamp
duty (July 1993) and exempting non-residents altogether (January 1994).
The fourth, and final, step was the gradual abandonment of the principle
of concentration of orders on a single market, with the explicit aim of
attracting to Paris the block trades which were executed by SEAQ-I dealers.
In 1989, the practice of quoting prices outside the mechanism of the
centralized auction was allowed, but only under very restrictive conditions.
Initially, only selected member firms could carry out trades on own account
(called operations de contrepartie) at prices different from those prevailing
on the exchange, but had to report them within 5 minutes to the exchange.
Moreover, if the trade had occurred at a price outside the fourchette (the
spread between the best sell and buy limit orders outstanding), the member
firm had to stand ready to buy or sell at that price so as to exhaust all the
orders in the interval between that price and the fourchette.  More recently,
these rules have been relaxed in order to develop a “block trading facility”
for the 50 most important stocks: all member firms can execute trades
exceeding the “normal block size” at any price within the “weighted average
spread” (fourchette moyenne ponderée), which is the interval between the
buy and sell prices that would on average be obtained for a trade of “normal
block size” (these prices are continuously computed by the CAC system).
After the trade, they have no obligation to place any order on the main
market, and even trade publication is not instantaneous, as explained above.
The new block trading facility has been moderately successful, although it
has not attracted the volume of trade that was hoped for by Bourse officials.
2.2.2. Madrid, Brussels and Milan
These three markets, formerly designed on the French model of an open
outcry call auction, closely followed the French example also in responding
to the competition by the London-based market-makers.11
In 1989, the Bolsa de Valores in Madrid adopted an automated
continuous trading system, replaced the agentes de cambio with sociedades
de bolsa that can trade on own account and can be owned by domestic or
foreign banks, insurance companies and securities firms.  Commissions
were deregulated, and a special facility for block trading was introduced. At
the same time, similar steps were taken in Brussels.   In 1989, the Brussels
stock exchange introduced an automated auction system. In December 1990
a law replaced the Belgian agents de change with French-style societés de
bourse, imposed a ceiling on stock transactions taxes, and allowed off-
exchange trades, provided their prices do not deviate by more than 2.5
percent from the previous trade on the exchange.
In 1991 the Borsa Valori in Milan went through the same exercise.
Italian stocks were gradually transferred from the open outcry call auction to
an automated continuous auction, the agenti di cambio were replaced by
Società di Intermediazione Mobiliare (SIM), commissions were liberalized
and all trade was concentrated on the official exchange.  The latter step was
very innovative for the Italian equity market, which had previously been
always characterized by a very large off-exchange trading volume, in some




As elsewhere in Continental Europe, also in Germany equity trading has
traditionally taken place via an auction mechanism, although with some
distinctive features.  First, trade has traditionally been segmented across the
eight regional German stock exchange floors, of which Frankfurt is by far
the most important.  Second, in each of these exchanges orders are matched
by a Kursmakler,  an officially appointed auctioneer who can take positions
on own account to avoid extreme price fluctuations. Third, German banks
7  This extraordinary segmentation of the Italian equity market before 1991 was mainly due to the
existence of statutorily fixed commissions on the exchange.  To avoid paying the 0.7 percent
commission to an agente di cambio, a bank receiving a client’s order would trade with another
bank off the exchange (so that it could retain a 0.35 percent commission) or, even better, cross the
trade in-house (in which case it would appropriate the entire 0.7 percent commission from the two
clients). The concentration rule was accepted by Italian banks because it was introduced together
with the liberalization of commissions and the elimination of the agenti di cambio’s monopoly.12
are the main players of the equity market, and they place their orders and
those of their clients with the Kursmakler via their own floor traders
(Handlers) or via dual-capacity brokers (Freimaklers). Freimaklers also
serve private clients directly and provide some competition to the
Kursmakler.
The fragmented nature of the market and its old-fashioned organization
left it increasingly exposed to the pressure of competition from SEAQ-I.
The response of the German banks involved the introduction of a
continuous, screen-based trading system, called IBIS, in early 1991.
Originally established by the banks, IBIS is now run by the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange between 8.30 a.m. and 5  p.m.. Participants can input orders or
one-way quotes and, whenever possible, orders are matched according to
time and price priority rules.  In addition, the Frankfurt stock exchange has
created an electronic order routing system (named BOSS), specifically
designed for small orders. At the same time, German stock exchanges were
transformed into a joint-stock corporation (Deutsche Börse AG), whose
main shareholders are the three top German banks - Deutsche Bank,
Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank.
8
In many ways, the German reforms were less radical than that of the
other Continental exchanges.  Rather than replacing the eight regional
exchanges with a single automated system and scrapping floor trading
altogether, the strategy was to set up a new automated facility running in
parallel with the floor and catering mainly to banks and other institutional
investors.  This reflects less concern with the principle of concentration than
in France.  It also reflects the conviction that, if superior, IBIS will
gradually steal  trading volume away from the floor of the regional
exchanges, as in fact is already happening.  The likely end result of the
process will be the gradual elimination of the regional exchanges, the
disappearance of the monopolistic Kursmaklers and the transformation of
the Freimaklers into independent brokers, probably allied with foreign
financial institutions or brokers.
8  The stakes are allocated as follows: 6 percent is owned by the Freimaklers, 5 percent by the
Kursmaklers, 10 percent by the regional exchanges, and the rest by banks according to their
importance in equity turnover.13
2.2.4. Amsterdam
The Dutch equity market is particularly vulnerable to international
competition, being highly dependent on about 25 international stocks of
Dutch origin (representing 85 percent of Amsterdam volume) which are
actively traded around the world.  As a result, the Amsterdam exchange
tried to respond to the cross-border competition from SEAQ-I and other
markets by several innovations.  As early as 1987, the Bourse supplemented
its traditional trading system run by the competing single-capacity dealers
(the hoekmannen) with the Amsterdam Interprofessional Market (AIM) - a
block trading facility designed specifically for the needs of institutional
investors and banks, who could trade directly for deals exceeding f. 1
million.  But this liberalization of the wholesale segment of the market was
not sufficient to prevent the loss of trading volume to other exchanges.  As
shown by the figures in Table 1, the competitive threat posed by the London
Stock Exchange was particularly fierce.
To face this threat, in 1994 a more hybrid system was introduced.  Small
orders (below a normal market size defined for each stock) are channeled to
a public limit order book cleared via a screen-based continuous auction
system.  The hoekman provides obligatory quotes in the limit order book for
the normal market size, and receives a 0.08 percent commission if he trades
on his book and a 0.016 percent commission if he does not, to give him an
incentive to improve spreads in the order book and increase executions.
Larger trades can be traded in a variety of ways: via direct deals, via in-
house matching, via a quote-driven screen-based system (named ASSET) or
via an automatic auction interdealer market (named AIDA).  The basic idea
of this complex architecture is to blend the most cost-effective and
transparent system for small orders, i.e. a French-style automated auction
system, with the widest possible choice of trading modes for large orders. It
is hoped is that this eclectic approach will succeed in concentrating Dutch
equity trading in Amsterdam, by offering the most appealing trading system
to each type of potential customer.
2.3.  Effects of the reforms of Continental exchanges
How effective has been the response of Continental exchanges to the
competitive pressure of SEAQ-I?  The effect of the reforms appears to have14
come in two stages.  Their immediate impact has been to offer a very
competitive market for retail customers, but no increase in trading volume
relative to SEAQ-I.  But after a few years, a reversal of trading volume
towards the Continental Bourses has taken place.
In the first stage, markets appeared to specialize according to trade size.
As we shall see in section 3.1, there is solid and consistent evidence that the
automated auctions of Continental exchanges had a comparative advantage
in the retail segment of the market.  But initially the Continental exchanges
did not recover market share relative to SEAQ-I.  On the contrary, Pagano
and Röell (1993a) find that, at least initially, the switch to the computerized
auction was associated with a fall in the trading volume of the Paris Bourse:
as stocks were moved to the new system, their turnover fell by about 20
percent relative to the market as a whole.  Urrutia (1990) finds the same
result for the Madrid stock exchange.  Murgia (1993) and Impenna, Maggio
and Panetta (1995) find the opposite for Milan, but their result may reflect
the concomitant introduction of the obligation to concentrate trade on the
official exchange, rather than the switch to continuous trading.  A possible
explanation for the initial fall in volume in Paris and Madrid is the initial
lack of experience with the new trading system. But another reasonable
explanation is that the new automated systems of Continental Bourses was
helping SEAQ-I market makers to make a more liquid market in London,
exploiting the greater transparency and faster dissemination of information
of the continuous auction.
More recently, however, trading volume has been flowing back to the
Continental Bourses. The order book on these exchanges has become so
thick and liquid that the London broker-dealers increasingly use them to
“work” block trades, by transforming them into a trickle of small orders and
executing them gradually in the continuous auction.  Typically, this happens
when the dealer’s final customer does not require immediate execution or
when the dealer has provided immediate execution of a block order and
wants to rebalance his inventories.  As the trading activity of the London
dealers in Continental exchanges increased, it tended to further enhance the
liquidity of these markets.
This reversal in the fraction of trade performed by SEAQ-I dealers is
increasingly recognized by the leading UK market makers. For example,
Natwest securities recently announced that “it will conduct far more of its
business on continental bourses than on London’s SEAQ International
system”, and its management motivated this choice as dictated by “the15
growing sophistication and transparency of local dealing systems in Europe”
and by their “greater efficiency in both cost and execution”.
9
This conclusion is partly supported also by the turnover statistics for Italy
and Germany, though not by those for France.  Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the
SEAQ-I turnover in Italian, German and French stocks as a percentage of
home market turnover in the same stocks.
10   As explained in Section 2.1,
these statistics must be interpreted with great caution.  Their actual levels
are not meaningful because of double-reporting of trades: a large number of
trades executed in the home market are reported also in London, and in
some cases only in London.  In addition, these figures are not comparable
across countries, because different exchanges compute turnover statistics
according to different conventions.  Despite these problems, the Italian data
in Figure 1 show a very clear and intriguing time-series pattern: a
remarkable rise in the proportion of London trading between 1989 and
1991, and a decline following the introduction of continuous electronic
trading in Italy in 1991.   The German data in Figure 2 tell a roughly similar
story: London’s proportion of German equity trading exhibit a mild
downward trend since late 1990, which coincides with the introduction of
continuous electronic trading (IBIS) in Germany in early 1991.
9 Financial Times, 26 October, 1995.
10 SEAQ-I turnover data are from the London Stock Exchange.  For Italian and French stocks, the
SEAQ-I volume has been divided by 2 to compensate for the “double-counting” in London (each
buy and sell order executed in London is counted as a separate trade in the published statistics).
This is unnecessary for the German volume, which is double-counted in the home market as well
as in London.
German data for 1990 were provided by Dr. Torsten Lüdecke of the Universität Karlsruhe, and
for 1991-95 by Martin Reck of Deutsche Börse AG.  The German turnover figures refer to trading
on all the German exchanges.  Italian data were supplied by Luca Filippa of the Consiglio di
Borsa.  French data were provided by Marianne Demarchi of the SBF-Bourse de Paris.  They
include all trades carried out through the central CAC trading system, and block trades acrried out
under the Paris block trading rules.  Since 1992, they also include after-hours trades done off the
central market.  To account for the distortionary effect induced by the initial public offerings
(IPOs) of BNP in October 1993 and Elf Aquitaine in February 1994,  the Paris data for these
stocks on their respective IPO dates  were replaced with the average daily volume of the relevant
month (excluding the IPO days).  For the SEAQ-I data, we replaced the turnover figure for
February 1994 with the average of January and March 1994.  We could not follow the same
procedure for BNP, as no SEAQ-I data are avilable before October 1993.  We therefore replaced
the turnover figure for October 1993 with the monthly average between October 1993 and March
1995.16
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The French data in Figure 3, instead, are inconsistent with the view of a
general decline of London trading.  However, this reflects much more the
unreliability of the official volume statistics than the true underlying story.
There is a rough market consensus that London’s proportion of total French
stock trading has declined from about 25-30 percent in 1990-91 to about 5-
15 percent today.  This latter estimate is also consistent with a very careful
study by Jacquillat and Gresse (1995), which produced an estimate of 8.35
percent for 1993.  French stock trades executed (as opposed to simply
reported) through the London Stock Exchange are now primarily large block
and program trades, which require the immediacy offered by a dealer
market.
This reversal in the trend increase of the trades executed in London has
been determined by three concomitant factors.  The first is the increase in
the liquidity, immediacy and transparency of the Continental markets,
credited to the introduction of the continuous, computerized auction and the
associated changes in market design and regulation.
The second reason is the declining willingness of London dealers to
commit substantial capital to market making in Continental stocks,
especially after the substantial losses deriving from such dealing in the early
1990s.  This decreasing commitment of SEAQ-I market makers has
translated into wider quoted bid-ask spreads, and thus to an increase in the
trading costs in London relative to Continental auction markets, as we shall
see in section 3.1.
The third motivation is a change in the attitudes by the final customers -
the so-called “buy side” of the market.  Final customers, especially
institutional investors, are becoming acutely aware of the cost of
immediacy, a development documented by Economides and Schwartz
(1994) for the US and by Schwartz and Steil (1996) for Europe.  More
specifically, they appear to be learning that the cost of immediacy is so high
that it is generally worth the wait: the price offered (or required) by a dealer
to take a very large position at once is often considerably less favorable than
the “average price” that the same dealer will offer (or require) if he is
allowed to “work” the order gradually in the continuous auction.  This
realization is at least partly due to the very transparency of the trading
system in Continental stock markets: institutional investors can now observe18
the prices at which their trades can execute in the continuous auction, and
thus how much they sacrifice by requiring immediacy from a dealer.
These three concomitant factors - the greater liquidity of the Continental
auctions, the decreasing commitment of market-making capital by London
dealers, and the diminished taste for immediacy by institutional investors  -
have drained trading volume away from the London market, which appears
to retain only a “hard core” of block trading, arising from customers who
demand immediate execution of their trades, and therefore cannot dispense
of the services of a dealer.
2.4. Stage 3: London market makers come under pressure
By the mid-1990s, the competitive position of London equity dealers has
reversed.  While a decade ago they were challenging the auction markets of
the Continental exchanges, now they must defend themselves from the
competitive threat created by auction markets, even in the market for UK
equities.  This challenge comes both from a new exchange set up in London,
named Tradepoint, and from the brand-new EUROCAC system created by
the Paris Bourse to trade non-French equities.
Tradepoint, which started operating in London in September 1995,
replicates the basic electronic auction trading mechanism used by virtually
all continental exchanges.  It has been set up by former executives of the
London Stock Exchange who tried unsuccessfully to introduce a continuous
auction mechanism into that market.  An innovative feature of Tradepoint is
that it allows institutional investors to trade directly, bypassing the
intermediation of broker-dealers.  Initially it offered continuous trading for
the largest 400 UK stocks, and in March 1996 it expanded its market to
more than 900 shares. Less liquid stocks are traded in a call auction.
EUROCAC, launched in January 1996, is instead the first instance of a
Continental auction market trying to attract cross-border trading in foreign
equities.  It is a segment of the Paris Bourse, which uses the same
infrastructure and trading technology as the CAC market to market
professionals wishing to trade non-French equities.  It can be accessed
through any Paris Bourse member firm, and initially it will deal with
British, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Swedish and Swiss blue chip stocks.  Its
ultimate objective is to trade the components of all major European indices,
i.e. around 500 stocks.  Though basically a continuous auction system, it19
also features a market-making element: for each stock, at least one market
maker will ensure permanent bid and ask price display for a minimum value
of FF 1 million.  EUROCAC trades are not subject to stamp duty, and its fee
structure is designed to provide an incentive to traders inputting limit orders
and a penalty to those inputting market orders, to maximize the liquidity of
the market.
While both Tradepoint and EUROCAC still have to prove their ability to
compete effectively with pre-existing exchanges, their potential competition
is already worrying London Stock Exchange officials. The Exchange is
replacing its current trading system, SEAQ, with an updated system, called
Sequence VI, with order-matching capabilities. Whether such a mechanism
should be actually available for trading has been a hotly debated issue
between the board of the Exchange and the main market-makers (the
controversy has even led to the abrupt dismissal of the Stock Exchange
chief executive, Mr Michael Lawrence, in January 1996).  The main London
market makers have fiercely resisted the introduction of an order-driven
trading mechanism, fearing that it will reduce their profitability and
eventually force them out of business. The collapse of the SEAQ-I dealer
market in Continental equities indicates that their fears may be well-
founded.  But if indeed an order driven mechanism can effectively compete
with the London market makers, this will happen even if the London Stock
Exchange were not to offer an order-matching system (Tradepoint and
EUROCAC are there precisely for this reason).
Eventually, after much controversy, in mid-1996 the majority of the
London Stock Exchange members convinced themselves of the need to
replace the SEAQ quote-driven system with an order-driven mechanism.
The proposed rules of the new system (SETS, an acronym for Stock
Exchange Electronic Service), recently detailed by the London Stock
Exchange (1996a), are very similar to those of the automated auctions of
Continental Bourses.
Market making is envisaged to survive only for large trades. As in
Continental Europe, the complex issue is how to allow market making for
these trades without too much damage for the liquidity and transparency of
the auction.  The general principle is that trades occurring outside the order
book will have an “interaction obligation” with the limit order book if it
occurs at the same price as an order present in the order book: to prevent a
violation of the time priority principle, the off-market trade can be carried
out only if the outstanding orders which qualify for “interaction” at the time
of the trade are also filled. However, some important exceptions are20
envisaged to this “interaction obligation”.  The main exception refers to
large orders subject to delayed  publication (currently trades over six times
the NMS). Other exceptions concern orders placed at times in which the
automated order book is not active, trades priced inside the order book
touch, certain proprietary trades of market makers, etc. (London Stock
Exchange, 1996b).
This dramatic change in the design of the UK Stock Exchange
development underscores an impressive degree of convergence between
equity trading mechanisms all over Europe. Just like the Bourses in the
Continent did earlier on, London is now developing a dual market structure,
with an order-driven main market and a block trading segment managed by
market makers.  And, just as in the Bourses, a crucial and sensitive issue is
how to coordinate these two different mechanisms.
3.  The current picture: transaction costs in the competing markets
3.1. Liquidity and immediacy
As noted above, one of the main reasons of the successful
“counterattack” mounted by Continental exchanges on the London dealer
market has to do with their comparatively low transaction costs offered by
their trading systems.  This confirms one of the most consistent empirical
findings about the relative efficiency of trading systems, i.e. that auction
markets offer considerably lower transaction costs, even though - unlike
dealer markets - they cannot provide instantaneous execution for very large
orders at a firm price.  In other words, auction markets offer cheap
execution but provide immediacy only for relatively small orders: traders
wishing instantaneous execution of large orders can obtain it only on a
dealer market.
One can use several methods to compare the liquidity of a dealer and an
auction market. The simplest one involves comparing the difference
between the lowest ask and the highest bid quoted by the competing dealers
(in London, the so-called market touch) with the difference between the best
buy and sell limit orders outstanding in the auction market (in Paris, the so-
called fourchette). One problem with the use of the fourchette as a measure
of the liquidity of a continuous auction market is that it applies to smaller
trades than the market touch: the two best limit orders in an auction market21
are typically much smaller than those for which dealers commit to quote
firm prices (the “Normal Market Size”, or NMS). But this problem can be
overcome by measuring the hypothetical average price that can be obtained
in the auction for a given order size, using data from the limit order book.
In particular, this average price can be computed for the order size for which
dealers post firm quotes.  Upon computing this price for buy and sell orders,
one obtains the average market spread (fourchette moyenne ponderée) - a
measure of the auction’s trading costs directly comparable with the market
touch.
These measures of trading costs have been computed in a variety of
studies.  Their results, summarized in Table 2, show that SEAQ-I quotes are
wider than domestic auction spreads in France (Pagano and Röell, 1990 and
1993a), in Belgium (Anderson and Tychon 1993), Italy (Impenna, Maggio
and Panetta, 1995), and Germany (Schmidt and Iversen, 1992, Davis, 1993
and Brown, 1994).
When these quoted spreads are used as a measure of trading costs, the
competitive gap between Continental auction markets and SEAQ-I appears
to have gradually widened over time.  While the fourchette has changed
little over time, the spread quoted by the SEAQ-I market makers has
roughly doubled in the early 1990s, as shown by Table 3.
A criticism that can be leveled at these comparisons is that quoted
spreads tend to overestimate trading costs in dealer markets, where trades
often take place within the market makers’ quote, especially for medium and
large transactions.
11 But more recent studies are immune from this criticism,
since they use actual transaction prices to compute the average realized
spread (or effective spread), as opposed to the quoted spread. They confirm
that London is not cheaper than the Continental Bourses.  De Jong, Nijman
and Röell (1993) conclude that the Paris Bourse offers lower transaction
costs than SEAQ-I for all trade sizes. This reflects the inclusion of crossed
trades, i.e. trades matched outside the CAC system, but priced within the
11  For the London stock exchange, this is documented by the figures reported in the Stock Exchange
Quarterly (April-June 1992, and October-December 1993). Reiss and Werner (1994) show that
the most common form of competition among market makers is not done by undercutting each
others’ quotes, but by giving discounts to customers over the phone, especially for intermediate
trade sizes. Röell (1992) reports similar results also for SEAQ-I, where the difference between
realized transaction prices at which dealers sell and buy French stocks is about half the quoted
bid-ask spread for the “normal market size”.22
fourchette. Comparing the realized spread, trading costs (excluding taxes
and commissions) are lower in Paris even at trade sizes of twice normal
market size.  Similar results are obtained for Belgian cross-listed stocks by
Degryse (1995), who computes both the quoted and the effective spread in
the Bruxelles continuous auction market and SEAQ-I, and finds that under
both measures the Brussels market offers lower trading costs than the
London market, for all trade sizes.  Finally, for cross-listed German stocks
Brown (1994) finds that SEAQ-I provides transaction prices comparable
with those provided by IBIS for trades executed with market-makers.
12
12  One could suggest that even these comparisons are unfair because they do not allow for the home-
country informational advantage: if information reaches the domestic exchange before the foreign
dealers, thedomestic bid-ask spread may be tighter than the foreign one for reasons unrelated to
the intrinsic functioning of the two markets.  But the home-country informational lead is not
sufficient to explain these differences, as shown by Booth, Iversen, Sarkar, Schmidt and Young
(1994) in a study of a matched sample of American stocks traded on NASDAQ and German
stocks traded on IBIS.23
TABLE 2. SEAQ-I MARKET TOUCH AND HOME MARKET FOURCHETTE











ponderée at NMS Study
French, 1989 1.52 0.41 0.5 Pagano and Röell
(1990, 1993)
13
Belgian, 1992 1.9 0.4 0.6 Anderson and
Tychon (1993)
14
Italian, 1992 1.69 0.41 Impenna, Maggio and
Panetta (1995)
15





13  Pagano and Röell (1990, 1993a) use two weeks of perfectly time-matched data from SEAQ-I and
from the Paris Bourse recorded in July 1989 for 16 cross-listed French stocks.  Their fourchette
moyenne ponderée is computed for order sizes ranging from half to twice the SEAQ “normal
market size”.
14 Andersen and Tychon (1993) analyze a group of 12 cross-listed Belgian common stocks,
accounting for more than half the total Brussels volume in 1992.
15  Impenna, Maggio and Panetta (1995) analyze all Italian shares cross-listed in 1992.
16 Schmidt and Iversen (1992) report comparative spreads on IBIS and SEAQ-I over the first and
second quarters of 1991. Beside the average quoted spreads reported in this table, they also
compute the SEAQ-I effective  spread for 6 stocks and find that it is on average 0.64 percent (the
effective spread is defined below in the text).  Davis (1993), using June-November 1993 data,
shows that a large proportion of SEAQ-I trades occurs at prices within 0.5 percent of the quote
mid-point.  Brown (1994) performs a detailed analysis of data between October 1991 and March
1992.  He confirms that IBIS offers a narrower spread than SEAQ-I if one considers quoted
spreads.24





July 1989 1993 1994
Q1 and Q2
1.52 2.66 3.37





1.70 1.69 2.53 3.50
1 Sources:  Pagano and Röell (1991, 1993), Impenna, Maggio and Panetta (1995)
and Quality of Market Review (Summer 1994).
In conclusion, the weight of the evidence suggests that, for all the trade
sizes for which we have data from both types of markets, Continental
auction markets are more liquid than (or at worst as liquid as) the London
dealer market.  This leaves us with the question of why the London dealers
get any trade at all in Continental equities.
There are three possible answers to this question.  First, we cannot
compare the depth of these two types of markets at the very high end of the
scale, since we have no data for the very large orders carried out by London
dealers markets: these orders may occasionally exceed the size of the entire
limit order book of the corresponding auction market.
Second, the bid-ask spread is only a part of the total cost of trading
equities, the rest being accounted by commissions and transaction taxes.
The larger bid-ask spread required by London dealers is often compensated
by their lower commissions, since many large London deals are done on a
“net” basis, with commissions included in the price.
Thirdly, our data fail to capture the time dimension of liquidity: a dealer
market can offer greater immediacy than a continuous auction, i.e. faster
execution at preset prices.  Immediacy may be important to some customers
not only because of their impatience, but because they need insurance
against execution risk, i.e. the danger of  adverse price changes while the25
order is filled.
17  It is also important to informed traders, who fear that the
information prompting their orders may become public before these are
carried out.
3.2. Competition and interdependence
Continental auction markets and SEAQ-I dealers compete for order flow,
but at the same time are interdependent.  SEAQ-I market makers set their
quotes exploiting the real-time price and order flow information
disseminated by the auction markets’ screens, and use those markets to
unwind their excess positions.  But also the Continental auction markets
benefit from the additional liquidity that London dealers often provide by
placing orders in their limit order book. This mixture of interdependence
and competition between the two markets is witnessed by at least two pieces
of evidence: the effect of trading activity on the Continental Bourses on the
SEAQ-I spread, and the continuous arbitrage between these trading systems.
3.2.1. Impact of the Continental Bourses’ trading on SEAQ-I spreads
Pagano and Röell (1990, 1993a) report that the London market touch for
cross-listed French stocks falls from 3 percent to 1.5 percent when the Paris
Bourse opens at 9.00 a.m. (UK time), stays approximately constant at that
level until the Bourse closes at 4.00 p.m. and then goes back up to almost 3
percent.  This 100 percent increase in the spread by far exceeds the
corresponding increase for British stocks in the London market.
18 A similar
pattern also emerges for German stocks between both IBIS and SEAQ-I on
one side and the Frankfurt Bourse on the other: just prior to the opening of
17 Pagano and Röell (1993b) provide a model where agents who are more averse to execution risk
may prefer the implicit insurance offered by a dealer to the lower expected trading costs of the
auction market.
18  Using evidence reported by Lee (1989), one can estimate by how much the market touch for
British stocks rises outside the “mandatory quote period”(from 9.00 a.m. to 5 p.m.): in the early
morning and in the evening the average touch is 14.3 percent higher for the most heavily traded
stocks (at the time called “Alpha” stocks), and between 9.9 percent and 8.2 percent for less
heavily traded stocks (“Beta” and “Gamma”, respectively).26
the Bourse at 9:30, spreads in both IBIS and SEAQ-I widen and both
markets become less deep (Brown, 1994).
19
There are two possible interpretations of these intradaily swings of the
market touch for cross-listed stocks, and they are not mutually exclusive.
The first one is that when they are open, Continental exchanges exert a
competitive discipline on London market makers who post prices for the
same stocks.  This “discipline” hypothesis is consistent with most of the
evidence on the effects of inter-market competition in the United States. The
second explanation relies on the presence of informed traders. When
Continental exchanges are open, London market makers rely on their prices
as a guide to set their quotes. Being less exposed to traders with superior
information, they tighten their spreads.
A related finding is reported by Impenna, Maggio and Panetta (1995),
who compare the SEAQ-I bid-ask spread on Italian cross-listed stocks
traded via the continuous auction in Milan with the spreads of the stocks
still traded via the call auction. In 1992, as the stocks of the first group made
the transition to continuous electronic trading, their average bid-ask spread
on SEAQ-I declined 35 basis points below that of the second group of
stocks. So the effect of home-country trading on the SEAQ-I spread appears
to be specifically linked to the fact that trading occurs via the continuous
automated auction.  This is not surprising if one considers that, in contrast
with the pre-existing auction system, the automated auction features instant
dissemination of price and order flow data, and allows very rapid order
placement.
These empirical findings suggest that, at least after the introduction of the
electronic continuous auction, the trading activity of the Continental
Bourses has been beneficial also for the users of the London SEAQ-I
market, making it more liquid than it would have been otherwise.
19  A similar result was also found for Italian cross-listed stocks in 1990, before the transition of the
Milan stock exchange to a continuous automated auction, but the increase of the London spread
after the Milan close was considerably smaller.  Pagano and Röell (1991) report that the average
market touch on Italian stocks in London started at 1.75 percent at 10:30 a.m., decreased to 1.53
percent at 12:00, then climbed to 1.62 percent at 1:30 p.m. and finally reached its highest value
after the Milan close, being 1.86 percent, at 3:00 p.m. (at the time the Milan stock exchange
closed at 2:00 p.m. on a normal trading day).  Similar figures are found also by Panetta (1991).
The fact that the effect is much weaker than for the French cross-listed stocks may  be due to the
fact that in 1990 the Milan stock exchange was not yet an automated exchange, and thus did not
provide the same type of real-time information on prices and order flow as the Paris Bourse.27
3.2.2. Continuous arbitrage and cross-border trading
The ease of access of the screen-based systems of SEAQ-I and of
Continental auctions allows arbitrageurs to keep the two types of markets
strictly in line with each other.  Pagano and Röell (1993a) find that SEAQ-I
and the Paris Bourse are perfectly arbitraged: in a sample of 380 perfectly
time-matched observations for 16 different stocks taken in July 1989, they
do not find a single unexploited arbitrage opportunity.  It is remarkable that
before the transition to automated trading arbitrage was less than perfect for
Italian stocks: Pagano and Röell (1991) and Panetta (1991) find that some
transaction prices struck in Milan in the “durante” session (the bilateral
trading session before or after the call auction) fell outside the
contemporaneous best bid and ask quotes of SEAQ-I dealers.  This is partly
because these trades were generally small and not very visible to the
generality of market professionals.
Thus, the visibility and fast dissemination of price data typical of the
continuous auction has increased the integration between the London market
and the Continental exchanges.  This integration has been favored also by
the fact that the main SEAQ-I market makers include major banks from the
Continent, who are members of the respective domestic exchanges (such as
Paribas for France, IMI for Italy, Deutsche Bank for Germany) and have
simultaneous access to SEAQ-I and home exchange screens.
But these markets are not linked only by arbitrageurs.  As already
mentioned, Continental  auction markets are used by the London market
makers to close their excess positions.
20 Moreover, as mentioned in section
2.3, dealers increasingly operate on the auction markets of the Continent
without taking the orders of their clients on their books but rather by
working the order gradually into the continuous auction at a price very close
to the bounds of the fourchette or even within the fourchette.
21
In the Paris Bourse some large intermediaries reportedly execute in this
fashion over 75 percent of their block trades in French stocks. Their strategy
20  In fact, Pagano and Röell (1991) find that, even though most of the time the Milan prices appear
to lead those in London, in some instances the reverse occurs.  This may reflect the price impact
of large orders imbalances that London market makers unload in Milan.
21  In the Paris Bourse, member firms can execute pre-arranged trades at a price within the fourchette
via a procedure known as application.28
often involves placing a sequence of limit orders which equal or improve
the best market quotes, rather than market orders. In their detailed analysis
of the order flow and of the limit order book in Paris, Biais, Hillion and
Spatt (1995) document that “a large fraction of the order placements
improves upon the best bid or ask quote” (p. 1657) and that these aggressive
limit orders appear to be motivated by the need to gain priority, especially if
the market is deep or the spread is wide. In contrast, under the Bourse’s
rules, if one places a market order, any excess that cannot be executed at the
best price on the opposite side of the limit order book is converted into a
limit order at best quote.
22 So the architecture of the trading system implies
that a dealer who wants to trade a block in the continuous auction quickly
must “provide liquidity” to the opposite side of the market by placing limit
orders, rather than “consume liquidity” by placing a single large market
order.  This trading activity of the dealers tends to contribute to the liquidity
of the continuous auction.  In this sense, the auction and the dealer market
are truly interdependent.
4.  Likely future developments
So far we have seen that the microstructure of European equity markets
has changed beyond recognition in the past decade. But the near future also
promises to be laden with change and turmoil. A host of factors will
increase even further the competition between trading systems both across
and within national boundaries: the regulatory changes brought forth by the
ISD, the emergence of proprietary trading systems, the pressure by
institutional investors to narrow broking margins, and the European
monetary union (if it happens) will all tend to increase the competition
between trading systems, and may eventually lead to the disappearance of
some of them via a process of concentration. The longer-term structure of
European equity markets will be affected by three main developments: on
the demand side, the transition to a funded social security system, which
22  In other words, a single large market order cannot execute in one shot against many limit orders
on the opposite side of the market. So, paradoxically, an impatient trader is forced to place a
sequence of limit orders within the fourchette, whereas a patient one may accept to place a market
order, have part of it converted automatically into a limit order at the best bid or ask quote and
wait until the latter executes.29
will greatly increase the weight of institutional investors in equity markets;
on the supply side, the completion of the ongoing privatization of European
state-owned enterprises and the possible development of an active market
for younger, high-growth companies comparable to that existing in the US.
4.1. Further increase in competition between exchanges
In the last decade cross-border competition from SEAQ-I has been the
engine of change in European stock markets.  In the future, also the
automated auction systems of Continental countries are likely to start
competing with each other, via cross-border branching of their network of
terminals. The birth of the EUROCAC trading platform in Paris is a first
symptom of this development. Several factors are going to stimulate this
incipient new wave of competition among exchanges.
4.1.1. Causes ...
First, the novel regulatory framework of the EU Investment Services
Directive (ISD), effective since January 1996, facilitates both cross-border
access for investment firms and cross-border branching by the electronic
networks of the European exchanges. The French and German Bourses have
already started to exploit this opportunity, establishing direct electronic
connections to investors in London and in other major European financial
centers. In the near future in each major European city financial
intermediaries are likely to have direct access to screens from CAC, IBIS,
SEAQ International, from the Madrid and Milan Bourses, etc. Initially these
terminals will be essentially vehicles to facilitate access to the various
domestic exchanges from abroad.  But gradually, as more and more stocks
become cross-listed, one may find the same stock being traded
simultaneously on several competing networks.
In addition to increasing cross-border competition, one can expect
sharper competition even within national boundaries owing to the growing
importance of proprietary trading systems (PTSs).  These are trading
networks set up by brokers in competition with official exchanges, and can
take several different forms.  In some instances, they do not contribute to
price discovery, and are simply facilities to cross orders at a reference price
drawn from an official exchange (such as the Arizona Stock Exchange in the30
US, which matches orders at the NYSE closing prices after the floor’s
closing time).  In other cases, they allow traders to post anonymous bids and
offers and negotiate electronically: the leading example here is INSTINET,
already present in the US and the UK and currently branching into
Continental Europe.  Some PTSs even provide an independent price
discovery mechanism.
A third factor which will promote competition is the increasing pressure
to cut trading costs from institutional investors.  Within the financial
services industry, power is gradually shifting away from stock brokers and
traders in favor of institutional investors, reflecting the latter’s increasing
weight in the order flow.  Institutional investors are increasingly conscious
of the toll that trading costs (commissions and bid-ask spreads) take on their
performance (Schwartz and Steil, 1996) and are therefore willing to “shop
around” different trading systems to achieve the cheapest execution of their
orders. In fact, the largest institutional investors are already capable of
executing their orders directly on electronic auction markets, and are
starting to gain direct access to the marketplace by using intermediaries as a
mere electronic “gateways” to place their orders.  This process of
disintermediation is likely to continue, and competition between
intermediaries will tend to be replaced by competition between trading
systems in the wholesale segment.
All this may be compounded by the effects of the European monetary
union, if and when this will happen (this outcome is still highly uncertain at
the time of writing). A single currency will eliminate exchange rate risk for
European investors and thus encourage them to hold more diversified equity
portfolios. The effect will be a great increase in cross-border trading. As a
result, to keep and increase their trading volume, national exchanges will
have to count less on the captive pool of domestic investors and more on
their ability to attract the more mobile foreign investors, competing with
alternative trading systems for the same stocks.
4.1.2.  ... and effects of increased competition
The proliferation of trading systems will offer investors greater variety
in the modes of execution of their orders, and will exert competitive
pressure on trading costs.  The wider choice will certainly be beneficial
for investors.  Auction markets will offer very cheap execution to investors
who want to trade small amounts as well as to large traders who are willing31
to wait for their order to be executed gradually. Direct access by
institutional investors to the limit order book of electronic markets may
become widespread. Dealer markets will be increasingly confined to
providing immediate execution to block traders who need protection against
execution risk, for instance because they need to close an arbitrage or to
carry out program trading.
The lower trading costs deriving from greater competition among trading
systems will also benefit issuing companies, since the implied reduction in
trading costs will be reflected into a higher issue price for equities, hence in
a reduced cost of equity capital for public companies.  This may also induce
more  companies to go public, thus helping equity markets in Continental
Europe to overcome its main historical weakness, i.e. the paucity of young
and entrepreneurial companies which turn to public equity markets to
finance investment and growth (in stark contrast with the US and UK
experience).
These beneficial effects from competition between markets unfortunately
cannot be had without bearing the associated costs deriving from their
increasing fragmentation.  One might hope that this tradeoff would vanish
if arbitrage keeps prices in line across the various market segments.
Arbitrage can indeed reduce the losses from fragmentation of the order flow,
but it cannot completely eliminate them, unless there is complete
transparency in all the market fragments.  This can readily seen if one
considers the example of the French cross-listed stocks.  Although the prices
of the Paris Bourse and the quotes posted by SEAQ-I market markers are
perfectly arbitraged, it is still true that the market-makers’ quotes in London
seldom reflect the true transaction prices that can be obtained from them,
and that the orders placed in London are not visible to the generality of
investors in Paris.  As a result, the Bourse is not as transparent as it would
be if all trades were concentrated there and, according to most models, also
the liquidity of the Bourse will be lower than under complete consolidation
of the order flow (see, for instance, Pagano and Röell (1996) and Madhavan
(1995)).
Another cost to be expected from the increasing segmentation of the
European equity market is the greater difficulty in detecting and policing
insider trading and fraudulent practices.  To a certain extent, this problem
may be counteracted by setting up a coordinated monitoring scheme and a
consolidated trade reporting tape across all the markets involved.  But the
costs of such coordinated surveillance scheme are going to be considerable,32
and they are to be weighed against the benefits associated with the increased
competition between markets.
However, at least in some cases, fragmentation may be only a transitional
phase, followed by eventual agglomeration of the trading flow in other
marketplaces: some exchanges may not survive this new wave of
competition. While the larger exchanges based in major financial centers are
certain to survive, smaller exchanges are at greater risk of losing trading
business to larger ones. A defensive strategy that smaller exchanges may
enact to counter this risk is to merge their dealing systems with other
exchanges. For instance, in June 1997 the Copenhagen and the Stockholm
stock exchanges have announced plans to create an integrated equities
trading market, which “could mark the first step towards the creation of a
pan-Nordic share market, embracing Oslo and Helsinki.”
23
To acquire the flexibility needed in the coming fight for survival, most
European exchanges have embarked into a process of transformation into
joint stock corporations. The idea is that a private legal structure should
allow them to respond more rapidly to the changing demands of investors at
home and abroad. Whether this will actually be the case will largely depend
on the ownership structure and control of the exchanges: depending on the
balance of power between domestic and foreign intermediaries, institutional
investors and issuers in the share ownership structure, national exchanges
will pursue different policies in competing with other markets. For instance,
an exchange tightly controlled by a cartel of domestic intermediaries will be
more tempted to delay or hinder the provision of remote access to foreign
investors, or more generally will hesitate before changing its trading system
in ways which may harm local intermediaries, as shown by the London
Stock Exchange’s reluctance to allow order-driven trading.
4.2. Long-run forces shaping European equity markets
In the longer run, three main factors are likely to reshape the
microstructure of European equity markets. The transition from unfunded
social security systems to funded pension plans will greatly increase the
23 Financial Times, 12 June 1997 (pp. 1 and 15).33
demand for equities and the prominence of institutional investors in
Continental Europe, where private pension funds currently are still marginal
(with the exception of the Netherlands). The design of trading mechanisms
in equity markets will therefore increasingly tend to accommodate the
trading needs of these investors.
At the same time, the massive privatization plans currently being
carried out in most European countries will expand the supply of equities in
the segment of large, “blue chip” companies, especially in the utilities
sector. Since the shares of large corporations tend to be the most actively
traded ones, the turnover rate and the overall liquidity of European equity
markets will increase.
The supply of equity capital to European markets may increase further
owing to an increased flow of  initial public offerings by young European
companies. Currently, companies tend not to list on stock markets to
finance investment and growth in the early stage of their life, unlike their
US counterparts: the average age of firms going public in Continental
Europe is 40 years (Rydqvist and Högholm, 1996), while in the US the
corresponding figure is 6.7 years for venture-backed firms and 11 years for
non-venture-backed firms (Gompers, 1992). The reasons why young
European companies have such a smaller propensity to go public are still
imperfectly understood: it is unclear to what extent this reflects their ability
to find other, more efficient channels to finance their investments or rather
their inability to access public equity markets – and, if so, which are the
obstacles obstructing their access to the stock market.  In a recent article,
The Economist has argued that the main obstacles may be Europe's
institutional investors aversion to invest equity in start-up firms and the lack
of a liquid stock market dedicated to small firms.
24 If so, the design of a
suitable market microstructure may help to induce young and dynamic
companies to go public, as shown by initiatives recently undertaken in
various European countries.
The French “Noveau Marché” is the most promising of these initiatives
in Continental Europe: created in April 1996, it attracted 23 companies in its
first year of life, and plans to add 25 more by the end of 1997. It has a
hybrid trading system: the electronic limit order book is supplemented by
the intervention of an “animateur”, a market-making intermediary paid by
24 The Economist, 25 January 1997, pp. 15-16 and 20.34
the issuer to supply liquidity and continuity to the market.  Currently the
Noveau Marché is still much smaller than London’s Alternative Investment
Market, which in 1996 had 283 listed companies. But recently Paris has
launched a coordinated effort with three other exchanges to create a single
Continental market for young companies: Frankfurt (Neuer Markt), Brussels
(Euro.NM Bruxelles) and Amsterdam (Nmax) are about to create, together
with the Noveau Marché, a four-market, fully integrated trading system for
young companies based in Brussels and called Euro.NM.
A similar attempt to foster a pan-European trading system for young
companies is being made by the new EASDAQ market, also based in
Brussels and designed very closely after the NASDAQ quote-driven trading
system in the US.  EASDAQ is funded by a group of European banks,
securities firms and venture capitalists, as well as by NASDAQ itself, and
hopes to attract particularly high-tech, dynamic young European companies.
To this purpose, its management is trying to persuade European companies
currently listed on NASDAQ to seek a dual listing on the new exchange.
It is still too early to say if initiatives such as the Euro.NM or the
EASDAQ project will contribute to increase significantly the flow of initial
public offerings by young and dynamic European companies. If they
succeed, they will have helped to remove a crucial bottleneck in the
development of European equity markets.
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